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THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE AND SOLIDARITY 
IN HEALTHCARE: 
FINDING COMPASSION IN THE ORIGINAL POSITION 
– Michał Zabdyr-Jamróz –
Abstract. In this paper I will juxtapose the concept of the veil of ignorance – a fundamental premise 
of Rawlsian justice as fairness – and solidarity in the context of the organisation of a healthcare 
system. My hypothesis is that the veil of ignorance could be considered a rhetorical tool that sup-
ports compassion solidarity. In the concept of the veil of ignorance, I will find some crucial features 
of compassion solidarity within the Rawlsian concept of “reciprocity” (actually, not being reciproc-
ity at all) – located between “impartiality” and “mutual advantage”. I conclude that, even behind 
this “thick” veil, some essential, yet “particular” facts on health and wealth redistribution are 
available to decision makers. Lastly, I discover that by means of the assumption of self-interest in 
the original position the veil aims to convert egoism into empathy, thus invoking the solidarity of 
compassion that in turn could be translated into principles of the organisation of a healthcare sys-
tem. 
Keywords: veil of ignorance, solidarity, healthcare system, justice as fairness, John Rawls. 
1. Introduction
Ruud ter Meulen rightly argues that solidarity should be given a greater 
role in healthcare. He points out, however, that the rights-oriented notion of jus-
tice – such as the Rawlsian justice as fairness – is in fact an obstacle to that. He 
finds that in this contractual liberalism 
… solidarity is … primarily conceptualised as the motivation of individuals to
support the existing systems of health care and social protection. This support is 
balanced mainly in regard to the financial contributions by the individuals to the 
system on the one hand and, on the other hand, the benefits they are expecting 
from the system in case they become needy themselves.1 
1 Meulen [2015] p. 6. 
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This “interest solidarity” – as opposed to “respect and compassion solidarity” – is 
based on some form of reciprocity: an exchange that is primarily supposed to be 
mutually beneficial for the individual. In healthcare systems, this means that ‘the 
contributions by the “givers” must be matched by the “right” behaviour of the 
“recipients” of health care’2 and the “givers” are finally entitled to some benefits.  
And yet, Rawls’ concept of the veil of ignorance – derived from his Theory of 
Justice published in 1971– is considered an impressive intellectual tool for develop-
ing theories of distributive justice. It has captured the imagination of many schol-
ars (including Dworkin3 or Harsanyi4), as it uses the premise of the liberal 
individualistic discourse of rights to build an egalitarian society. It should be no 
surprise that Rawls’ theory has found its way to the theory of healthcare systems – 
most notably in the works of Daniels,5 but also (not always affirmatively) in 
Korobkin,6 Epstein,7 Soto,8 and others. The results of these intellectual (and even 
empirical9) experiments varied, but the impact of the Rawlsian theory only en-
forced the interest-oriented solidarity. An alternative to ‘interest solidarity’ would 
be ‘compassion solidarity’.  
Following the idea of ‘respect and compassion solidarity’ or ‘reflexive soli-
darity,’10 I define compassion solidarity as a type of cooperation that is based on 
reciprocal willingness to provide assistance to those in need;11 a willingness that 
comes from compassion towards others – not from ‘expectation of future bene-
fits.’12 It is ‘standing in for each other’13 because of genuine empathy. A question 
remains, however, whether it would be possible to find such compassion solidari-
ty in the original position. Can we redeem the veil of ignorance from egoism and 
detachment? 
In my paper I argue that the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the original posi-
tion – after a minor reinterpretation – could be a promising device for inducing an 
                                                 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Dworkin [1981] p. 283–345. 
4 Harsanyi [1953] p. 434. 
5 Daniels [2001] p. 2–16, [1990] p. 273, [1985]. 
6 Korobkin [1998] p. 801–836. 
7 Epstein [2000]. 
8 Soto [2012] p. 387–404. 
9 Swope et al. [2008] p. 811–818. 
10 Houtepen and Meulen [2000] p. 374. 
11 Prainsack and Buyx [2011]. 
12 Häyry [2005] p. 199–206. 
13 Jaeggi [2010] p. 288. 
Michał Zabdyr-Jamróz ◦ The Veil of Ignorance and Solidarity in Healthcare… 
 81 
ethical sense of respect and solidarity among people. Firstly, I carefully examine 
the characteristics of knowledge that is ignored behind the veil. I notice that only 
the kind of knowledge that betrays our position should be “veiled”, thus – even 
behind the “thick” veil – some essential yet “particular” facts on health and wealth 
redistribution are available. Secondly, I argue that the veil of ignorance does not 
provide impartiality by detaching us from society; rather, it submerges us in it 
through the idea of “reciprocity” – situated between “impartiality” and “mutual 
interest” (thus combining procedural and allocative justice). It should be noted 
here that these terms used by Rawls are somewhat misleading in terms of what 
they actually designate; hence, careful examination should be provided. Finally, 
I conclude that – with the presented reinterpretation – the veil could be considered 
a heuristic leverage converting self-interest into empathy and supporting compas-
sion solidarity. While so doing, I explore some of the consequences of this mode of 
reasoning for the organisation of a healthcare system. 
2. The veil of ignorance criticized 
2A. THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AND THE VEIL 
The main feature of justice as fairness applicable to healthcare is the ‘differ-
ence principle’ as a basis for positive social rights and the distribution of goods. 
The principle states that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be ... to the great-
est benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the “difference princi-
ple”).’14 This is a part of a set of two rules that are to be the result of a social con-
tract made in the ‘original position’ by equal, free and rational individuals.15 The 
difference principle appears to represent the institutionalised solidarity of those 
better-off – wealthier and healthier – with those in a more difficult situation: the 
poor and the sick. Rawls notes himself that the difference principle ‘provides an 
interpretation of the principle of fraternity’ – ‘the idea of not wanting to have 
greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off.’ Fra-
ternity implies ‘a sense of civic friendship and social solidarity, but so understood 
it expresses no definite requirement.’16 However, this does not mean that justice as 
fairness – with its individualistic inclination – can so easily be reconciled with 
compassion solidarity. 
In order to explore this subject, I will revisit the Rawlsian argumentative 
strategy to see how he reached his conclusions. The key concept here is the idea of 
                                                 
14 Ibidem, p. 53. 
15 Rawls [1999] p. 118–123. 
16 Ibidem, p. 90. 
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original position where parties are located behind the veil of ignorance. The veil of 
ignorance is to ensure that the individuals making decisions on the future terms 
of cooperation are not biased. It is an assumption that certain particular 
knowledge on the actual position of parties is to be “ignored”. ‘Since all are simi-
larly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular condi-
tion, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.’17 It is 
precisely the veil of ignorance – making the original position to be fair – that is the 
gateway to the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness.18 
2B. “AN INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE” 
There are various philosophical critiques of the concept of the veil of igno-
rance; most notably the communitarian ones, pointing out that Rawls’ theory de-
picts people as ‘ciphers’, turning them into ‘unencumbered selves’, thus rendering 
the whole theory pointless.19 Rawls and his proponents defend it insisting that it is 
not an anthropological claim, but merely an argumentative tool. It is a hypothet-
ical construct – an intellectual exercise – that serves practical and political purpos-
es rather than philosophical ones.20 As Richard Rorty points out, this approach 
should be perceived in the spirit of American pragmatism – as giving ‘the priority 
of democracy to philosophy.’21 The validity of the concept does not rely on the 
truth of its ontological assumptions, but on the ability to resolve current problems 
of policy and politics – at least in terms of establishing certain general principles or 
guidelines. 
What is problematic here, though, is, of course, whether anyone would ac-
tually be able to perform such a feat. Obviously, finding oneself behind the veil of 
ignorance for the purpose of actually bargaining is not something that is supposed 
to actually happen. The veil seems to be a normative ideal that we should strive 
for in our personal deliberations – individual considerations of what would be 
fair. Hence, I will not dwell here on the issue of the probability of achieving such 
a virtue. Instead, I will try to inquire what kind of virtue or fairness the veil is in-
tended to promote. Are the premises of the original position actually worth taking 
and to what end do they lead? 
 
 
                                                 
17 Ibidem, p.11. 
18 Rawls [1999] p. 118–123. 
19 Cf. Sandel [1982] p. 87, 179. 
20 Rawls [1996] p. 27. 
21 Rorty [1991] p. 179–196. 
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2C. THE NON-EGALITARIAN RESULTS PROBLEM 
Interestingly, as some scholars note, the prerequisites of the veil of igno-
rance in the original position do not necessarily lead to the difference principle 
– especially in healthcare. Roemer argues that a ‘properly modelled decision prob-
lem behind the veil of ignorance cannot be used to justify egalitarianism.’ His cal-
culations show that the veil (in his version) would establish a tax system that ‘will 
generally behave “pathologically,” from a resource-egalitarian viewpoint’ – name-
ly, ignoring the priority of those worst-off, for instance the disabled (i.e. not taking 
the “prioritarian” view as it should).22  
Epstein’s work seems to be perfect confirmation of concerns regarding 
such a counterintuitive conclusion. He argues that in the original position people 
would rather choose a free-market healthcare system. This is because the parties 
would also take into consideration the costs of positive rights to healthcare – the 
‘second-order costs of distorting the market incentives’ and thus decreasing 
the overall wealth of society. The main argument is that community rating (equal 
and not risk-related contributions) in healthcare insurances would discourage 
healthy lives.23 However, those conclusions, as Korobkin points out, seem to veer 
towards utilitarianism, which would entirely miss the veil’s goal. 
2D. SPECIFIC CASES OR GENERAL RULES? 
There have even been some experiments testing people’s choices under 
a “laboratory veil of ignorance” and whether it would produce results expected by 
Rawls' theory of justice. It turned out that the “veiled” preferences of individuals 
‘are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized.’24 The 
problem with the experiment was that it was concerned with an actual money 
gambling situation, rather than with an actual deliberation on the principles of 
how future cooperation should be regulated. 
In healthcare – in particular, in the resource allocation decisions – Carlos 
Soto claims that we should use other methods. He argues that the veil ‘fails to 
provide clear guidance regarding resource allocation’ because it ‘does not deter-
mine which features are morally relevant for a given distributive problem.’ Even if 
it produces definite results, however, these conclusions – as in Daniels’ considera-
tions on age25 – ‘do not in themselves have important moral standing.’ 
A ‘choice behind a veil of ignorance arguably fails to take persons seriously’ – it 
                                                 
22 Roemer [2002] p. 167. 
23 Epstein [2000]. 
24 Swope et al. [2008]. 
25 Daniels [1990] p. 53. 
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‘does not treat various lives as actualities’, instead merely as ‘possibilities that may 
or may not occur.’26 Such a decision is particularly questionable when made on 
some utilitarian criteria, such as the QALY indicator (quality-adjusted 
life-year).27 
To address these remarks, one might observe, however, that the veil itself is 
not meant to solve any particular cases but is intended as a device to produce gen-
eral organizational rules – principles of future cooperation. The Rawlsian veil 
could be considered an abstract and universal (or general) embodiment of the sol-
idarity principle. It is abstract and general not in terms of being “detached” or im-
practical, but as opposed to a “specific” and “particular” level of solidarity – i.e. 
concerning general rules and principles and not individual cases. The distinction 
is important when considering how risk-averse parties in the original position 
would be. One might easily behave riskily when facing single or even several cas-
es of betting on some benefits, hoping for better luck next time. However, when 
settling one’s entitlements once and for all, one might not be so willing to gamble 
so easily with life. There is a vast difference between agreeing to one bet with 
a slim chance of winning and agreeing to such rules of the game that would make 
someone systematically loose every bet. 
Obviously, when facing difficult decisions about who should receive a heart 
for transplantation, it would be absurd to ignore issues of age, individual health, 
etc. Ignoring personal information – on lifestyles, personal preferences, religious 
beliefs (as would occur behind the “thick” veil of ignorance), but even on social 
status, family background, profession and income – in choosing treatment for 
a given patient would entirely miss the point. However, could the veil of igno-
rance be “corrected” to serve for any dilemma – general and particular alike? To 
address this issue, I must explore to what extent the veil “detaches” us and makes 
us ignorant. 
3. The veil of ignorance reinterpreted 
3A. PEEKING THROUGH THE VEIL: HOW MUCH CAN WE KNOW? 
Roamer makes an interesting point in his critique of the veil: 
The benefit of the veil-of-ignorance construct is that it forces objectivity, or impar-
tiality. But the cost is that we must make decisions with a great handicap – we 
have discarded massively important information that is available to us in the real 
                                                 
26 Soto [2012]. 
27 Singer et al. [1995] p. 144–150. 
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world, namely, what the actual joint distribution of resources (here, wealth and in-
ternal sources) and types is. The veil-of-ignorance approach asks us how we 
would allocate resources if we did not know that actual distribution. But would it 
not be better to think about the problem of distribution (now, redistribution) 
knowing what the actual distribution is, if we could otherwise maintain impartiali-
ty? The answer is surely yes, because we, or the decision maker in question, would 
have much more information available.28 
This corresponds with Soto’s critique: ‘if we want to take seriously the reality of 
each person’s point of view, our distributive ethics ought to take as its starting 
point the actual positions of persons.’29  
Indeed, the main problem with the veil is how much information it ex-
cludes from the decisional process. Rawls assumes that in the original position the 
parties do not know ‘certain kinds of particular facts.’ He then enumerates that 
behind the veil no one knows his or her ‘place in society, his [or her] class position 
or social status;’ ‘fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, intelli-
gence and strength, and the like;’ ‘conception of the good, the particulars of his [or 
her] rational plan of life, or even the special features of his [or her] psychology 
such as his [or her] aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism;’ – but 
also – ‘the particular circumstances of their own society.’30 The latter concerns ‘its 
economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been 
able to achieve.’ Parties do not even have ‘information as to which generation they 
belong’ to.31 
This last exclusion is the most problematic part of the whole concept, one 
that makes the Rawlsian veil very thick and extremely detaching from the real 
world. This is in clear conflict with the idea of compassion for and responsibility to 
the actually existing poor and sick, by – seemingly – making us utterly unaware of 
their existence (Rawls anticipates: “some may object, principles should be chosen 
in the light of all the knowledge available”32). Why should the veil be so thick? 
Would ignorance behind the veil include information on a given society’s “partic-
ular” (here and now) economic and health inequalities? This is perplexing, 
because such information is actually vital, especially in establishing healthcare 
systems.  
                                                 
28 Roemer [2002]. 
29 Soto [2012] p. 401. 
30 Rawls [1999] p. 118–119. 
31 Ibidem, p. 118. 
32 Ibidem, p. 120. 
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Rawls explains his intent in this exclusion with the example of not knowing 
one’s own generation. He claims that such knowledge would ruin the fairness of 
justice between generations regarding ‘for example, the question of the appropri-
ate rate of capital saving and of the conservation of natural resources and the envi-
ronment of nature.’ As Rawls explains, 
… in order to carry through the idea of the original position, the parties must not 
know the contingencies that set them in opposition. They must choose principles 
the consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever generation 
they turn out to belong to.33  
Immediately thereafter Rawls adds: 
It is taken for granted, however, that they [the parties in the original position] 
know the general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and 
the laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatev-
er general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice.34 
He later stipulates that the intent of justice as fairness is merely that ‘the differ-
ences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational 
and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments.’35 Following this 
remark, we could assume that the ignorance behind the veil concerns, for instance, 
the ‘economic or political situation’ of a given society when it is to establish rules 
of cooperation with other societies, in which case such knowledge would make 
this party biased. Otherwise – when such knowledge would not reveal one’s own 
‘situation’ – ‘particular’ knowledge on, for instance, health and wealth redistribu-
tion would actually be classified as such ‘general facts’ that ‘affect the choice of the 
principles of justice’ and thus should be considered. 
As it seems, the veil is not about “not knowing” anything about ourselves, 
society, its values, resource redistribution, etc. In fact, it requires significant 
knowledge and understanding of those issues – especially the general truths about 
society, cultural diversity, class structure, vested interests, various life plans, etc. It 
merely asks us to forget for a brief moment – the moment of decision – all the in-
formation about our own particular preferences, interests and values. In the origi-
                                                 
33 Ibidem, p. 119. 
34 Ibidem, p. 121. 
35 Ibidem, p. 120. 
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nal position, we should know as much as possible about ‘the actual distribution,’ 
and ignorance behind the veil would only refer to my and others’ actual share – 
knowledge that would make our decisions biased. In order to make a fair choice, 
we should know that there exist the unhealthy, disabled and in other ways disen-
franchised. If we treat the concept of health determinants seriously, we should 
also know with what traits their disenfranchisement would be correlated; namely, 
race, gender, confession, ethnicity, education, residence, income, social class, etc. 
This information is necessary to properly deal with health problems related to the 
issue of inequalities. What we should not know – or rather ignore – is which traits 
are possessed by each individual. 
3B. THE VICE OF DETACHMENT 
One of the main problems with the veil of ignorance was pointed out by So-
to in the conclusions of his paper: 
The charge that choice behind a veil of ignorance denies the reality of each per-
son’s point of view is clearest in certain cases. If a deliberator knew that it was un-
likely that he/she would occupy a particular position, then that could lead to dis-
counting the plight of someone who will actually come to occupy that position. 
This is implausible.36 
This is very troubling, because the veil – by situating us outside the particular lives 
of actual persons, and thus making us unbiased and impartial, is also detaching us 
from real lives. This reservation is critical if we interpret justice as fairness as just 
another theory assuming that the best way to judge and organise society is to be 
“impartial” – hence “from the outside.”  
On the other hand, one might note that the construction of the original posi-
tion does not actually locate us on the outside of society as an “unbiased”, “un-
committed observer.” In the original position, everyone is a party in the contract – 
a stakeholder – but being behind the veil everyone is completely unaware of what 
his or her actual stake is. Hence, to properly decide in the original position one 
should imagine oneself as everybody else. As Rawls puts it (referring to Rous-
seau’s Social Contract), behind the veil of ignorance, ‘whatever a person’s temporal 
position, each is forced to choose for all.’37  
3C. “RECIPROCITY”: BETWEEN IMPARTIALITY AND “MUTUAL ADVANTAGE” 
                                                 
36 Soto [2012] p. 401. 
37 Rawls [1999] p. 121. 
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The idea of a social contract between free individuals leads Rawls to the 
conceptual distinction between the reasonable and the rational. In general, Rawls 
(referring to Sibley) described the difference between these concepts as follows:  
Knowing that people are rational we do not know the ends they will pursue, only 
that they will pursue them intelligently. Knowing that people are reasonable 
where others are concerned, we know that they are willing to govern their conduct 
by a principle from which they and others can reason in common; and reasonable 
people take into account the consequences of their actions on others’ wellbeing. 
The disposition to be reasonable is neither derived from nor opposed to the ration-
al but it is incompatible with egoism, as it is related to the disposition to act moral-
ly.38 
It is reason – understood in this way – that is the foundation of justice as 
fairness. According to Rawls (who agrees with Allan Gibbard’s interpretation), 
justice as fairness is based on reciprocity, which is between impartiality and mu-
tual advantage.  While impartiality – according to Rawls – is altruistic and moti-
vated by the idea of the general good, mutual advantage is ‘understood as every-
one’s being advantaged with respect to one’s present or expected situation as 
things are.’ Impartiality seems to refer to the concept of the detached impartial 
observer, whereas mutual advantage gives the impression of being attributed to 
a benevolent, sympathetic benefactor.  
 When studied carefully, some of these terms seem highly “technical”, as 
their colloquial meaning might be somewhat misleading. In the case of mutual 
advantage, perhaps the term “general advantage” would be more appropriate, 
since “mutuality” refers to commutative justice – suggesting a sort of transaction-
al, quid-pro-quo arrangement, which is evidently not the case. In this instance, the 
term “reciprocity” might also be misleading, since it also denotes the practice of 
exchanging things (with equal value) with others for mutual benefit. Either way, 
the Rawlsian reciprocity lies right in the middle of – or combines – these two. 
The concept is about benevolence combining the advantages of impartiality and 
sympathy without the drawbacks of either: i.e., the unfeeling detachment of the 
former or the involvement bias of the latter. It is ‘a relation between citizens ex-
pressed by principles of justice that regulate a social world in which everyone 
benefits judged with respect to an appropriate benchmark of equality defined with 
respect to that world.’39 
                                                 
38 Rawls [1996] p. 49; Sibley [1953] p. 554–560. 
39 Rawls [1996] p. 16–17; Gibbard [1991] p. 266. 
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This terminology might, to a certain extent, correspond to the distinction 
between procedural and allocative justice. Rawls argued that justice as fairness is 
not utilitarian allocative justice. It should be stressed, however, that it is not pure 
procedural justice either.40 Reciprocity attempts to combine these two types of jus-
tice in order to create a fairer social order. Simply put, impartiality – as pure pro-
cedural justice – is blind to anyone’s interests in the name of abstract rules: totally 
inconsiderate towards the actual results of the application of the rules. In this in-
stance, it might be perceived as simply heartless. By being impartial in obeying 
any set of pre-established rules – with which we agree in general – we might not 
notice that in reality this hinders (even our own) chances, significantly reducing 
one’s benefits from cooperation or even making cooperation harmful. Mutual ad-
vantage – or rather “general advantage” – on the other hand, ignores rules in or-
der to satisfy certain interests based on actual needs. Actually, this type of justice 
does not require cooperation between individuals at all (or mutuality for that mat-
ter). It merely ‘assimilates justice to the benevolence of the impartial spectator and 
the latter in turn to the most efficient design of institutions to promote the greatest 
balance of satisfaction.’41 
The unique nature of “being behind the veil of ignorance” lies in the fact 
that it is supposed to induce the virtue of considering all the facts and being 
involved (perhaps even emotionally), yet still being unbiased towards anyone in 
particular. To be specific, apparently, the veil – instead of making us impartial – is 
supposed to make us “omni-partial”. It introduces selflessness in establishing 
rules that should consider all parties and all interests.  
3D. NEGOTIATIONS AND RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM VS. SOLIDARITY 
Here another problem occurs. The idea of a social contract suggests that the 
principles of the organisation of society are reached through negotiations (rather 
than voting, since at this point everyone has a veto power, being able to “leave the 
table”). This is because of our colloquial and everyday experiential connotation of 
the term “contract”. What is relevant in negotiations is the leverage power, be-
cause it is based on mutual concessions. Some parties have the upper hand: more 
to offer and more to resign from. Others must deal with having more to lose in the 
event of an absence of cooperation. This is a bargain where in fact information – 
for instance, on what the other party values most – is one of the greatest assets; 
thus, concealing information should be an appropriate tactic. A bargain implies 
                                                 
40 Rawls [1999] p. 76. 
41 Ibidem, p. 77. 
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that parties are primarily interested in their own interest and – when finally estab-
lishing cooperation – they actually compete. 
However, the Rawlsian idea of a ‘social contract behind the veil of igno-
rance’ is something very different. Behind the veil ‘the parties have no basis for 
bargaining in the usual sense. No one knows his situation in society or his natural 
assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage.’42 
If you do not know whether you will be healthy or sick, rich or poor, industrious 
or clumsy, you do not treat others as competitors. It is precisely because you can 
be any of them that you want to know as much as possible about what they need 
and what can help them. Soto admits that the veil ‘embodies 
a conception of others as possible loci of my own well-being.’43 Therefore, behind 
it there is nothing like “not my problem.”  
Thus, the “contract” behind the veil of ignorance is supposed to make you 
want to know how it is – how it feels – to be a poor, disabled or chronically ill 
member of a disenfranchised minority. It is supposed to make you “feel” for such 
a person – to empathise with the self-interest of others. Quite possibly, the veil 
might resemble Ghandi’s Talisman: 
I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes 
too much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the 
weakest man [woman] whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you 
contemplate is going to be of any use to him [her]. Will he [or she] gain anything 
by it? Will it restore him [her] to a control over his [her] own life and destiny? In 
other words, will it lead to swaraj [freedom] for the hungry and spiritually starving 
millions? Then you will find your doubts and yourself melt away.44 
In this state of mind one does not just want to negotiate: bargain for the best bene-
fits “for a particular me.” The veil is supposed to make you search for the best, 
fairest way to deal with health and social inequalities, especially those that are not 
choice-related.  
The healthcare insurance dilemma is an excellent context to illustrate that 
the “reciprocal” nature of the veil is not at all about transactional mutuality. “Rec-
iprocity”, colloquially speaking, involves some kind of mutual exchange of goods 
or services. From the perspective of a selfish agent, it can generate seemingly al-
truistic behaviour (such as occasional generosity); however, such altruism is lined 
                                                 
42 Ibidem, p. 120–121. 
43 Soto [2012]. 
44 Ghandi [2004] p. 1. 
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with egoism because of the expectation of a delayed pay-off. Such reciprocal altru-
ism – or “interest solidarity” – would mean, in the context of healthcare, that I con-
tribute now to the treatment of others but one day others will pay for mine. To 
some extent – in such an insurance scheme – this could take the form of hypotheti-
cally reciprocal altruism: by contributing to the health fund I can expect that if 
I get seriously ill, I will get expensive treatment; for now, others benefit from my 
contributions just as I hypothetically could. In general, this self-interested homo 
economicus premise can be mitigated by the idea of reciprocal altruism, based on 
the concept of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
A problem occurs when someone decides that he or she does not care about 
an insurance in which his or her contributions grossly exceed any benefits. Within 
reciprocal altruism, such a person could be concerned with how uneven the bur-
dens are to any pay-offs. Even more, such a person could even claim that she or he 
does not need any insurance at all, because of her or his wealth and income or be-
cause of the certainty of being sufficiently healthy till the end of his or her life (or 
perhaps their unwillingness to go to the doctor at all) – thus ignoring even the hy-
pothetical reciprocity idea.  
Justice as fairness – precisely through the veil heuristic – is not based on 
that kind of reciprocity at all. Quite the contrary: according to Rawls, a party be-
hind the veil of ignorance should prefer the difference principle – i.e. some mech-
anism of wealth redistribution that takes from the rich and healthy and gives to 
the poor and sick or disabled. However, he or she does not prefer it because, when 
the veil is removed and it turns out that he or she is rich and healthy (thus con-
tributing more than gaining), the party expects at least some reciprocal benefits 
from others at some point in life (which might never happen). The party does that 
because of imagining him- or herself in the place of others – especially those in the 
worst possible position. Thus we reach the compassion solidarity: contributing 
despite the lack of reciprocity or mutuality in benefits. 
3E. SUBVERTING SELF-INTEREST AND MELTING IT AWAY 
For Daniels, the veil of ignorance is a particularly useful tool for consider-
ing the issues of ageing in healthcare,45 because – as Soto puts it – since it concerns 
everybody, it transforms ‘the age-group problem from an interpersonal to an in-
trapersonal problem: How should a prudent person distribute resources over the 
course of a lifetime?’46 This approach, however, bears the very same drawbacks 
that liberal “interest solidarity” is criticized for: it reduces a complicated dilemma 
                                                 
45 Daniels [1990a] p. 58. 
46 Soto [2012]. 
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of interdependencies in the healthcare system into individual calculations of one’s 
interest over time. Soto points out that even before discussing the conditions and 
assumptions of ‘a valid deliberation and choice behind the veil, there is a prior 
more important question: Why is this mode of self-interested choice appropriate 
for resolving interpersonal conflicts?’47 
As ter Meulen points out, 
… solidarity means the willingness to protect those human persons whose exist-
ence is threatened by circumstances beyond their control, particularly natural fate 
(for example genetic disease) or unfair social structures. There is no self-interest at 
stake in this type of solidarity: you support the other because he or she needs your 
protection and is worthy of your protection.48 
It seems that solidarity does not fit into the original position, since what motivates 
parties therein is egoism. 
Evidently, one of the key features of the original position is that the parties 
are motivated by self-interest, being rational as in the fictional construct of homo 
economicus (which of course is merely a model for economic prognosis). It is hard 
to say to what extent such a party will be selfish, but given the abstract and hypo-
thetical nature of the original position this does not seem relevant. One might ar-
gue that the premise of self-interest is a necessary safeguard for justice as fairness 
that protects it from inconvenient outcomes – those allowing (or demanding) ex-
treme altruism (self-sacrifice, martyrdom) or even selfless evil (from envy or fanat-
icism). Also, it is supposed to make parties more risk-averse when deciding on 
principles of cooperation.  
Without egoism, behind the veil, someone inclined to social Darwinism 
could decide, for instance, that if he or she eventually turns out to be the worst-off 
in the society, it is actually good, because by not being industrious enough he or 
she would deserve such a fate. Apparently, the assumed egoism prevents this pos-
sible outcome of impartiality where, for instance, someone decides – in a proce-
durally just manner – that harsh competitive rules will be most preferable for soci-
ety as a whole, even despite the fact that those rules would harm him or her. 
Through the assumption of self-interest, the veil forces us to empathise with 
someone who is not willing to suffer for the benefit of others.  
At first glance, the veil of ignorance transforms an interpersonal problem 
into an intrapersonal one. However, it is supposed to work the other way around 
                                                 
47 Ibidem, p. 398. 
48 Meulen [2015] p. 4-5.  
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– it is supposed to utilize this prudence of self-care to consider others. It – para-
doxically (and apparently counter-intuitively) – transforms an intrapersonal prob-
lem (“What is best for me?”) into an interpersonal one (“What is best for others?”). 
And it does that by pretending that it is an interpersonal problem of ‘not knowing 
one’s own social or health/disability status.’ In other words, the veil of ignorance 
is intended to provoke you to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself,’ but first it requires 
you (at least in this hypothetical situation) to actually ‘love thyself.’ However, 
when you finally find yourself behind the veil; when – to quote Ghandi again – 
you ‘recall the face of the poorest and the weakest,’ then ‘you will ... yourself melt 
away.’49 
It is true that the veil of ignorance is not supposed to overcome or eliminate 
selfishness. However, through a reasoned rhetoric it is supposed to subvert 
selfishness to serve compassion and to convince us to feel responsible for others 
when making institutional arrangements. It does this by forcing us to imagine our 
egoistic self in the worst health and social condition. 
4. Conclusion 
As I have shown, the Rawlsian heuristic of the veil of ignorance could be 
considered a way of integrating a liberal, individualistic sense of justice with the 
theory of solidarity based on responsibility and compassion. It seems that Rawls’ 
theory reinforces the idea that even a liberal system of rights-based model is in fact 
grounded on benevolence and solidarity – even though in its liberal form it is 
highly artificial and reasoned.  
Solidarity, in its most profound meaning, is based on empathy, that is, 
‘blurring the line between self and other.’50 The main problem for empathy is of 
course the problem of ‘other minds.’51 As Hodges and Klein put it, 
…  unless we are characters in a science fiction story, we can’t actually get “inside” 
other people’s heads to know their subjective experiences. Instead, we must rely 
on our imagination and knowledge of ourselves and people in general to infer 
what might be going on in the minds of others.52 
                                                 
49 Ghandi [2004] p. 1. 
50 Davis et al. [1996] p. 713. 
51 Kant [1929]. 
52 Hodges and Klein [2001] p. 437–452. 
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From this reinterpretation perspective, the veil is precisely that: it persuades 
us towards empathy by making us imagine ourselves in such a science fiction sce-
nario.  
The closest metaphor for the veil of ignorance would be some kind of 
memory manipulation device – one that confuses our memories for the duration 
of negotiations. It makes us forget entirely which side of the negotiations we are 
on. This goal would probably also require mixing all of the memories of the par-
ties involved, because particular knowledge would give away parties’ individual 
stories and identities. Thus, all parties would have the same set of information, 
including some socially shaped preferences and conceptions of the good. The 
actual bargain would disappear, because “mine” and “theirs” would be indistin-
guishable. It would thus be justified to say that the veil is aimed towards empathy, 
by ‘bridging the gap that exists between the self experience and others’ experienc-
es.’53 
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